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		<title>From Innovation to Adoption: A Narrative Scoping Review of DefenceTech Ecosystems, Startups, and Dual-Use Acceleration Mechanisms</title>
		<link>https://minib.pl/en/numer/no-4-2025/from-innovation-to-adoption-a-narrative-scoping-review-of-defencetech-ecosystems-startups-and-dual-use-acceleration-mechanisms/</link>
		
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				<category><![CDATA[academic entrepreneurship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[competency asymmetry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[innovation policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[research commercialization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology transfer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[university–industry collaboration]]></category>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><!--<strong><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start"></span><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;">1. Introduction</span></strong>

The DefenceTech sector has become a fundamental component of current security and industrial policy (Ilchenko et al., 2021). Key factors contributing to this development include accelerating geopolitical competition, technological shifts, and the growing military relevance of commercially driven innovation (Hajdú, 2025). In the geopolitical landscape, governments and international organisations are increasingly prioritising technologies with both civilian and defence applications. These technologies are being recognised as essential for achieving strategic autonomy, ensuring secure supply chains and maintaining operational advantage. The European Commission formally identifies dual-use research and development as a critical pillar of Europe’s technological sovereignty and recommends expanding support mechanisms for such innovation (Publications Office of the EU, 2024).

DefenceTech is defined as the set of technologies and systems employed to strengthen defence capabilities in the domains of intelligence, surveillance, communications, cyber defence, autonomy, space, and advanced sensor or simulation environments. Recent developments in European defence innovation have been dominated by dual-use technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), advanced materials, cyber-security tools, and space-based services. Analyses of European strategic dependencies have demonstrated that dual-use capabilities, including robotics, unmanned systems, additive manufacturing, batteries and semiconductor-based technologies, are imperative for both military readiness and industrial resilience (Blagoeva et al., 2019).

The strategic value of DefenceTech is reinforced by Europe’s evolving security environment. Increased great-power competition, the growth of hybrid threats, and escalating military activity in neighbouring regions have caused a shift in defence planning towards faster innovation cycles and greater technological independence (Hajdú, 2025). European legislative assessments emphasise that critical technologies particularly AI, quantum technologies, space technologies, cyber technologies and advanced materials are essential for securing defence readiness and industrial competitiveness (European Commission, 2025b; NATO, 2025c). These assessments also highlight the importance of coordinated industrial investment and stronger public–private cooperation in order to sustain the development of Europe’s defence capabilities (European Parliament, 2023).

The defence innovation landscape now relies heavily on commercial technology ecosystems. Major breakthroughs in areas such as autonomy, cybersecurity, machine learning, robotics and advanced computing now originate from startups and SMEs rather than defence prime contractors. Defence institutions are increasingly dependent on civilian innovation pipelines, particularly in areas with dual-use potential. Analyses at parliamentary and alliance level confirm that many technologies essential for military modernisation first emerge in commercial markets before being adapted for operational use, thus reversing the historical direction of innovation in the defence sector (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2024).

NATO’s technology policy frameworks also emphasise the importance of incorporating startups, SMEs and up-and-coming tech companies into defence capability development. Alliance-level initiatives outline mechanisms for accelerating the adoption of technologies, improving procurement processes and enabling a faster transition into operational use. The 2025 Rapid Adoption Action Plan recognises innovation ecosystems as a structural requirement for maintaining technological advantage, encouraging closer collaboration between defence authorities, the private sector, and academia (NATO, 2025b).

Despite the growing number of institutional reports and policy analyses on DefenceTech innovation, existing literature remains fragmented and often lacks an integrated analytical perspective on how startups, venture capital and acceleration mechanisms jointly shape defence innovation ecosystems.

This article therefore addresses the following research question: How do startups, financing mechanisms, and acceleration instruments jointly shape technology adoption pathways within DefenceTech innovation ecosystems, and what structural barriers constrain this process? The study aims to synthesise available academic and institutional evidence on these dynamics in order to identify the key enabling and constraining factors for defence innovation adoption in the European and transatlantic context.

To structure the analytical framework of this study, the research examines four interrelated dimensions of DefenceTech innovation ecosystems: the structural and institutional barriers influencing ecosystem functioning, the evolving roles of startups as key innovation actors, the impact of financing models and acceleration mechanisms on innovation pathways, and the ecosystem-level collaboration processes shaping the adoption of emerging defence technologies.

<strong><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;">2. Methodology of the Review</span></strong>

This article is designed as a narrative scoping review combining peer-reviewed academic literature with institutional and policy documents (grey literature). The aim of this review is to synthesise existing knowledge on DefenceTech innovation ecosystems, focusing on the interaction between startups, financing mechanisms and acceleration instruments, and to identify structural barriers and enabling factors shaping technology adoption.

This study applies a narrative scoping review approach aimed at synthesising dispersed academic and institutional knowledge. The review primarily covers materials published between 2019 and 2026. Key search terms included: “Defence Technology ecosystem”, “Defence innovation ecosystem”, “dual-use innovation”, “defence startups”, “military innovation accelerators”, and “defence venture capital”.

Sources included peer-reviewed academic publications and institutional reports (EU, NATO, RAND, SIPRI, ESA, OECD). Grey literature was included due to the policy-driven nature of defence innovation. Materials were selected based on relevance to innovation ecosystems, financing mechanisms, institutional barriers and technology adoption. Media commentary and purely technical engineering studies were excluded.

The analysis followed a thematic synthesis approach structured around recurring themes such as procurement constraints, investment dynamics, interoperability requirements and acceleration mechanisms.

&nbsp;

<strong><span class="fontstyle2" style="font-size: 18pt;">3. DefenceTech Ecosystem Context</span></strong>

<strong>3.1. Key DefenceTech domains</strong>

Institutional analyses and strategic reports indicate that the development of DefenceTech in the European Union and globally is increasingly focused on a limited number of technological areas considered key to future military capabilities. The most frequently identified areas include artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, cybersecurity and electronic warfare, space technologies, microelectronics, and quantum technologies (European Commission, 2025a).

The RAND Corporation report indicates that in the short and medium term, the most important military applications of artificial intelligence relate to data analysis, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics optimization, and decision support systems, with the analysis focusing on the impact of AI on the conduct of military competition rather than on a detailed assessment of specific categories of autonomous strike systems (RAND Corporation, 2026). In this context, AI is seen primarily as a tool for increasing the speed and quality of decision-making through the fusion of sensor data, predictive analysis, and improved situational awareness (NATO, 2024).

In the European Union, a similar approach can be seen in the structure of projects financed under the European Defence Fund, where the use of artificial intelligence focuses mainly on command and control systems, operational data analysis, and planning support (European Commission, 2025c). Similar priorities are identified in the strategic documents of the US Department of Defense, which emphasize the responsible use of AI, the need for human oversight, and the pursuit of decision-making advantage rather than full autonomy of combat systems (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022).

Unmanned systems (UAVs, UGVs, USVs) are widely identified as one of the key areas of development for DefenceTech. However, analyses by the International Institute for Strategic Studies emphasize that their operational effectiveness depends primarily on the degree of integration with command, communications, and electronic warfare systems, and not solely on the technical parameters of the platform itself (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2024).

Experience from the conflict in Ukraine, analyzed by SIPRI, among others, shows that unmanned systems can significantly influence the course of combat operations, while being highly vulnerable to electronic jamming, countermeasures, and rapid cycles of technological adaptation on both sides of the conflict (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2025). In the European Union, the development of these technologies focuses mainly on reconnaissance, logistics, and security applications, which is reflected in the portfolios of projects financed by the European defence Fund and the European defence Agency (European Defence Agency, 2023a).

Publications by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence indicate that a significant portion of cyber threats in the military environment are related to the software supply chain, including commercial components integrated into defence systems (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), 2024). Consequently, DefenceTech development in this area focuses on increasing the resilience of command and control systems, securing the software supply chain, and integrating cyber defence and electronic warfare capabilities into multi-domain operations (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023).

The Space Threat Assessment 2024 report prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies indicates that satellite systems, particularly those in low Earth orbit (LEO), are playing an increasing role in military communications, navigation, and reconnaissance capabilities, while at the same time becoming more vulnerable to interference, cyberattacks, and counter-space activities (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2024).

In the European Union, space-related defence technology includes the development of Earth observation systems, secure satellite communications, and navigation services, carried out under European Union programs and in cooperation with the European Space Agency (European Space Agency, 2024). At the same time, SIPRI analyses indicate that space has become an area of intensifying strategic competition between major international actors (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2024b).

A special report by the European Court of Auditors indicates that limited access to advanced microelectronics is one of the key constraints on the development of modern DefenceTech systems in the European Union (European Court of Auditors, 2025).

Semiconductors are a critical component for systems based on artificial intelligence, radar, electronic warfare, and autonomous platforms, which means that their availability has a direct impact on operational capabilities.

Quantum technologies remain at a relatively early stage of development for military applications. UNIDIR analyses indicate that the most realistic short-term applications are in quantum sensing and precision measurement systems, while quantum communication and cryptography are seen as a long-term prospect (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2024). At the same time, the EU, the US, and China treat quantum technologies as part of long-term technological competition, which is reflected in strategic documents and research and development programs (RAND Corporation, 2024).

<strong><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;">4. Ecosystem Actors in DefenceTech Innovation</span></strong>

Defence innovation ecosystems are often described as structured around three interdependent pillars: military science, industrial capabilities and defence requirements, whose interaction determines the direction and effectiveness of technological development (Hajdú, 2025).

DefenceTech innovation ecosystems consist of several interdependent actor groups whose roles shape both technological development and adoption pathways. Startups operate as key sources of innovation, particularly in software, autonomy and cyber capabilities, where rapid iteration cycles contrast with the longer development timelines of traditional defence contractors. Qualitative ecosystem studies based on twenty-six semi-structured interviews further indicate that startups increasingly shape defence innovation trajectories despite structural entry barriers related to procurement and regulatory complexity (Atkinson, 2025).

Venture capital investors increasingly influence the sector by introducing scaling logics and risk models derived from the commercial technology domain, which affects procurement expectations and growth strategies.

Defence industrial ecosystems are structured as multi-tier supply networks in which prime contractors depend on extensive layers of specialised suppliers and SMEs, illustrating how innovation emerges through vertically integrated yet interdependent actor relationships rather than isolated firm-level capabilities (Heidenkamp et al., 2011). Defence institutions and prime contractors remain dominant demand-side actors, as access to testing infrastructure, certification procedures and acquisition programmes largely determines whether new technologies transition from experimentation to operational deployment.

In parallel, accelerators and publicly supported innovation programmes function as intermediary actors that reduce coordination barriers between emerging firms and military stakeholders, supporting early validation and ecosystem integration. Comparative analyses of defence innovation intermediaries indicate that newly established organisations already replicate seventeen out of twenty functional roles traditionally performed by commercial innovation intermediaries, reinforcing their systemic role as boundary-spanning actors within emerging defence innovation ecosystems (Schmid &amp; Wong, 2020). Research on asymmetric innovation partnerships demonstrates that defence innovation ecosystems evolve through iterative collaboration between large integrators and startups, where empirical learning cycles continuously reshape value creation and capability development processes (Graarud &amp; Kristensen, 2025).

Together, these actors form a structured innovation environment in which institutional constraints, financing mechanisms and collaboration formats co-evolve rather than operate as isolated drivers of change. Empirical ecosystem research based on longitudinal data from 4,903 investor–investee relationships shows that technological alliances within an ecosystem can positively influence venture performance, highlighting the importance of interdependent actor networks in innovation ecosystems (Chen et al., 2024). Comparative defence innovation research analysing seven national innovation systems demonstrates that technological advantage emerges from interactions between state institutions, industry and scientific actors rather than from isolated technological breakthroughs (Cheung, 2021).

<strong>Types of DefenceTech startups</strong>

Startups have become a key driver of technological innovation in the DefenceTech sector, particularly in areas where rapid experimentation, iterative development and high-risk technological exploration offer an advantage over traditional defence industrial models. Their growing importance reflects a global shift in defence innovation dynamics, whereby emerging capabilities largely originate from the commercial and dual-use sectors rather than from conventional defence contractors. This trend is evident across Europe and NATO, where strategic documents consistently recognise startups as major contributors to emerging and disruptive technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and next-generation space systems (NATO, 2025b).

DefenceTech startups can be broadly categorised according to their technological focus and operating model. Hardware-oriented startups develop physical systems such as drones, autonomous ground vehicles, robotic platforms, sensors, novel materials, energy systems or small satellites. Such ventures typically require substantial capital, access to testing environments and lengthy prototype cycles. Structural barriers within DefenceTech ecosystems also exhibit a strong spatial dimension. Empirical analyses indicate that approximately 85% of Defence Innovation Ecosystem startups are concentrated in urban innovation hubs, while only 15% operate in peripheral regions, limiting access to testing infrastructure, institutional networks and defence stakeholders outside core ecosystem locations (Kondrats et al., 2025). Their importance is emphasised by Europe’s need to enhance its capabilities in critical supply chain areas such as advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, power systems, and space technologies (European Commission, 2024a).

Software-oriented startups are focusing on digital capabilities, including cyber defence tools, command-and-control systems, AI-based decision support systems, data fusion platforms, and simulation technologies (Schwarz, 2025). These ventures are one of the fastest-growing segments in the sector as defence institutions are becoming increasingly dependent on flexible and scalable digital infrastructures (European Commission, 2021). Assessments of critical technologies for European defence identify advanced software and AI capabilities as vital for operational readiness, resilience and situational awareness (European Parliament, 2023).

A third group consists of dual-use startups whose technologies originate in civilian markets but have strategic defence applications. These include companies specialising in robotics, Earth observation analytics, cybersecurity, digital twins, telecommunications, advanced materials, energy storage and autonomous mobility. The European Commission’s 2024 White Paper identifies these firms as being crucial to Europe’s long-term technological sovereignty, as dual-use innovation frequently surpasses traditional defence R&amp;D, enabling the military to adopt commercial technologies more efficiently (European Commission, 2024d).

Building on the typology of DefenceTech startups discussed earlier (hardware-focused, software-driven and dual-use ventures), Table 1 links the structural barriers they face with governance instruments and resulting ecosystem-level effects.

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<span style="font-size: 18pt;"><strong><span class="fontstyle0">5. Innovation Financing and Acceleration Mechanisms</span></strong></span>

<strong>5.1. Public and Private Funding Instruments</strong>

The financing of innovation in the defenceTech sector is currently undergoing significant change, driven by the growing role of the dual-use approach and the need for shorter technology development cycles. Traditional defence procurement models were based mainly on large public contracts, while the modern financing ecosystem includes venture capital, specialized funds, European Union instruments, and national programs targeting startups and SMEs (European Commission, 2023).

The growing activity of venture capital funds in the DefenceTech sector is directly related to the convergence of civil and defence innovations, particularly in the areas of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and space technology. Corporate venture capital plays the role of an intermediary between startups and the traditional defence industry in this process, offering access to technological infrastructure and testing environments that enable early validation of solutions (European Commission, 2025d). Investments in DefenceTech are characterized by higher regulatory risk and a longer return horizon than classic deep-tech, which affects the structure of financing rounds and the participation of the state as a co-investor.

In response to the need for faster absorption of strategic technologies, specialized investment funds are being created. Public–private financing mechanisms increasingly shape DefenceTech ecosystems, as illustrated by the NATO Innovation Fund, a €1 billion multilateral venture capital initiative designed to invest in dual-use startups and accelerate technological scaling across allied innovation networks in areas such as AI, quantum computing, and autonomy (NATO Innovation Fund, 2026). The In-Q-Tel model, on the other hand, shows that strategic funds can act as the first technology customer, accelerating the commercialization of solutions developed by young technology companies (In-Q-Tel, 2026).

At the European Union level, the European defence Fund (EDF) remains a key support instrument, financing research and development projects carried out by international industrial and technological consortia. The EDF increases the participation of startups through requirements for SME participation and financing of high-risk technologies, which often do not receive private support in the early stages of development (European Commission, 2026). The EDF is complemented by civilian instruments such as the European Innovation Council, which enable the financing of deep tech with dual-use potential and provide startups with a pathway into defence projects (European Innovation Council, 2026).

The result is a hybrid model of DefenceTech financing, combining public grants, VC investments, and pilot contracts, in which the return on investment is often strategic in nature, related to technological resilience and industrial autonomy, rather than solely to financial gain. European policy analyses emphasise that dual-use innovation ecosystems increasingly rely on SMEs, startups and scale-ups operating across civil–defence boundaries, reflecting a shift from traditional defence-only innovation models toward hybrid ecosystem structures (European Commission, 2024c).

<strong>5.2. Acceleration programs and support instruments</strong>

In response to the problem of the defence sector’s limited capacity to rapidly absorb technological innovations, new mechanisms for accelerating and adopting innovations have been initiated, with the aim of shortening the gap between technological development and its potential use in the security and defence environment.

At the alliance level, one of the key new instruments is NATO DIANA (Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic) (NATO, 2026). According to NATO documents, DIANA was established in response to the need to systematically integrate civilian innovators into the defence ecosystem and to test technologies considered critical to the Alliance’s security, such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, space technologies, system resilience, new materials, and energy (NATO, 2025a). The program focuses on working with innovators in the early stages of technology development and creating conditions for their pilot validation. Selected projects gain access to a network of accelerators and testing infrastructure, allowing for early assessment of their operational suitability without launching full procurement procedures (NATO, 2026). This mechanism aims to shorten the time needed to identify technologies with military potential and reduce the risks associated with their further development.

The DIANA architecture design includes test environments referred to as Living Labs. According to NATO implementation documents, the first pilot Living Lab is currently being launched, enabling technology validation in conditions similar to operational ones and direct interaction with military users (NATO, 2026). These solutions are intended to support the transition from technology demonstration to its potential adoption within NATO structures, especially in areas where the pace of civilian technology development significantly exceeds that of traditional armament programs.

DIANA’s activities are linked to the Alliance’s transformation processes coordinated by NATO Allied Command Transformation, which is responsible for integrating the findings of technological experiments into NATO doctrine, training, and exercises. ACT ensures the consistency of innovation with long-term capability planning (NATO Allied Command Transformation, 2025).

At the European Union level, the European defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), established under the European defence Industrial Strategy, is the framework instrument supporting defence innovation. According to European Commission documents, EUDIS aims to increase the EU’s capacity to absorb defence innovation by coordinating activities in the areas of technology testing, interoperability, and the inclusion of new entities, in particular startups and SMEs, into the European defence ecosystem (European Commission, 2025a).

Space technologies are also an important component of this ecosystem. ESA Business Incubation Centers serve as incubators for space startups and are not defence programs or formally focused on dual-use technologies (European Space Agency, 2026). At the same time, the European Space Agency consistently points out that technologies developed within space programs, in particular Earth observation, satellite navigation, secure communications, and satellite data analysis, are key components of modern security and defence capabilities, including situational awareness and critical infrastructure resilience. In this context, the announcement of the creation of a new ESA center in Poland, focused on security and dual-use technologies, is also significant. According to ESA communications, this initiative is intended to complement the Agency’s existing instruments and strengthen the development of technologies relevant to national security and systemic resilience, without replacing the ESA BIC network (European Space Agency, 2023).

In addition to allied and EU initiatives, national acceleration programs and rapid technology adoption mechanisms, which often feature greater procedural flexibility and stronger links to end users, play an important role in the DefenceTech ecosystem.

In the United Kingdom, this function is performed by the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), which operates on the basis of so-called themed calls and problem-led competitions. This mechanism enables the testing of technologies in response to the specific operational needs of the Ministry of Defence, as well as the conduct of pilot projects and demonstrations in close cooperation with the military and security services (UK Ministry of Defence, 2026).

In France, a similar role is played by the Agence de l’innovation de défense (AID), operating within the structures of the Ministry of the Armed Forces. The AID integrates acceleration, experimentation, and dialogue with military users into a single institutional process, which allows for rapid testing of technologies and their adaptation to French operational needs (French Ministry of Armed Forces, 2026).

The analysis indicates that the problem of the DefenceTech sector’s limited capacity to absorb innovation has been clearly recognized at the allied, EU, and national levels. In response, initial steps have been taken in the form of acceleration programs and technology testing and adoption instruments, such as NATO DIANA, EUDIS, and selected national mechanisms. However, these initiatives should be seen as the initial stage in the process of building a more coherent defence innovation system.

<strong>5.3. Ecosystem collaboration</strong>

The development of DefenceTech is becoming increasingly dependent on the coordinated cooperation of public authorities, the armed forces, industry, research institutions, and private technology firms. Defence innovation ecosystems are multilayered structures in which each stakeholder contributes capabilities that no single entity can provide alone. Governments and public administrations play a foundational role in this ecosystem by defining strategic priorities, setting regulatory frameworks, financing early-stage research and development (R&amp;D) and shaping long-term industrial policies. European and NATO-level strategies emphasise the need for state institutions to ensure continuity of investment in emerging and disruptive technologies, reduce regulatory fragmentation and create targeted instruments to support dual-use and defence innovation (European Commission, 2024d).

DefenceTech ecosystems rely heavily on armed forces due to their specialised operational expertise, specific capability needs and access to authentic testing environments. Defence organisations provide mission-based feedback that is essential for validating technology in areas such as autonomy, cyber defence, situational awareness, data fusion, advanced sensors and robotics. NATO’s strategic analyses identify structured military–technology interaction as a decisive enabler of EDT maturity and operational adoption, particularly where testing, certification and iterative co-development are required (Fertasi, 2019). The armed forces also contribute to standardisation, doctrine integration and long-term capability planning, making them an indispensable partner for startups and private firms seeking to align their innovations with defence requirements (NATO, 2025b).

The industry, comprising both defence contractors and emerging technology companies, provides the necessary production capacity, supply chain infrastructure, and system integration capabilities to translate prototypes into scalable, deployable systems. While traditional defence companies remain essential for highly complex platforms such as aircraft, naval systems, advanced communications and integrated command networks, startups and SMEs contribute agility and specialised technological breakthroughs. Analyses of European defence innovation emphasise that industrial cooperation must leverage these complementary strengths to accelerate the adoption of critical technologies, including AI, quantum technologies, advanced materials, and space systems (European Parliament, 2023).

The formation of DefenceTech ecosystems is now primarily organised through public–private partnerships (PPPs). These partnerships facilitate co-investment and co-development, as well as providing shared access to expertise, infrastructure, and testing environments (Fertasi, 2019). They also enable risk-sharing between governments and private actors, which is particularly important in early-stage technological domains that require long development cycles and significant capital. The European Commission and the Joint Research Centre emphasise the structural requirement of PPPs for reducing Europe’s dependency on external technologies and for strengthening domestic capabilities across critical sectors, including semiconductors, robotics, cybersecurity, materials, and energy systems (Liwång, 2022).

At the operational level, defence innovation ecosystems are becoming more dependent on innovation hubs, accelerators, co-creation facilities and test ranges, which bring together military users, researchers, startups and industry. NATO’s innovation framework encourages the creation of integrated environments in which technology developers can experiment, receive cross-domain feedback, and adapt solutions progressively for deployment (Fertasi, 2019). The importance of such ecosystems is consistently emphasised in alliance-level analyses of emerging and disruptive technologies, which highlight the strong correlation between EDT adoption and the availability of shared testing infrastructure, open innovation channels and structured public–private collaboration (NATO, 2025c).

These ecosystems also facilitate knowledge transfer between civilian and defence sectors. Dual-use technologies often originate in commercial markets, yet their successful adaptation for defence applications requires operational validation, cybersecurity hardening, compliance with defence standards and integration into military systems architectures. Innovation ecosystems therefore function as translation mechanisms that connect fast-paced commercial R&amp;D with the stringent technical and security requirements of defence institutions. Recent DoD initiatives such as the TRL Bootcamp pilot launched in March 2024 illustrate institutional attempts to bridge the transition gap between early-stage funding mechanisms and operational defence programs, highlighting systemic challenges in technology maturation pathways (Doumitt et al., 2025).

Long-term capability planning in Europe further highlights the increasing requirement for systemic cooperation. European defence policy frameworks advocate coordinated national and EU-level action to enhance industrial resilience, support cross-border defence supply chains, and align technology development priorities among member states. These policies emphasise that DefenceTech innovation cannot rely exclusively on market forces, but rather requires active collaboration between the public and private sectors to guarantee sovereignty over vital technologies and maintain competitiveness in emerging fields.

In practice, effective cooperation within ecosystems leads to the accelerated adoption of technology, reduced development risk, improved interoperability, and stronger strategic autonomy. Thus, DefenceTech ecosystems operate not just as collections of independent actors, but as interdependent networks in which administrations define strategic direction, armed forces provide operational insight and industry transforms emerging technologies into deployable capabilities. Public–private partnerships, shared testing infrastructures, and coordinated innovation frameworks create an environment that enables DefenceTech to grow and deliver long-term security and technological advantages (Ilchenko et al., 2021).

<span style="font-size: 18pt;"><strong><span class="fontstyle2">6. Structural and Institutional Barriers in DefenceTech Ecosystems</span></strong></span>

Despite growing strategic importance, DefenceTech startups face a unique and complex set of development challenges. Long procurement cycles pose a significant barrier to early growth, as defence institutions typically require multi-year validation, certification and budgeting procedures before acquiring new technologies. Studies of ten early-stage dual-use hardware startups reveal hybrid financing patterns combining federal grant funding with venture capital investment, reflecting the increasing convergence between public innovation programs and private capital within DefenceTech ecosystems (Amir &amp; Rombach, 2025). Analyses of defence technology transition processes indicate that moving from prototype development to operational deployment frequently requires five to seven years, reinforcing the systemic mismatch between rapid technological innovation cycles and institutional acquisition timelines (Naval Postgraduate School, 2020a). Analyses of national security innovation systems emphasise that commercial innovation ecosystems prioritise accelerated development cycles and rapid scaling, creating structural tensions when these dynamics interact with slower defence procurement processes (Wilson, 2024). This contrasts with commercial markets, where shorter sales cycles and broader customer bases enable faster revenue generation. Parliamentary and alliance-level analyses consistently highlight that slow procurement processes limit the deployment of emerging technologies and reduce smaller firms’ ability to scale (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2024).

Further barriers to entry are raised by regulatory and compliance requirements. Export controls, security clearances, data-handling rules and defence-specific certification standards impose administrative and financial burdens that many early-stage ventures find difficult to meet. Recent defence industry analyses highlight that the rapid proliferation of innovation pathways, accelerators and acquisition mechanisms has created a complex institutional landscape that many non-traditional vendors struggle to navigate effectively (Carberry, 2023). In practice, security clearance procedures may extend up to 18 months even for experienced defence suppliers, significantly increasing entry costs for startups and slowing the transition from prototype development to operational deployment (Andersson, 2022). These constraints are particularly challenging for dual-use companies operating in both commercial and defence markets, as they must navigate the complex intersection of regulations affecting product design, manufacturing, talent recruitment, and international expansion. The European Commission is aware of these challenges and has recommended reforms to encourage cross-border innovation and reduce regulatory fragmentation in Europe's dual-use sector (European Commission, 2024d).

Access to testing environments, military users and mission-specific data also affects the development of startups. Many emerging technologies, such as autonomous navigation, sensing, space situational awareness and cyber defence, cannot be validated without realistic operational conditions. Defence institutions are working to expand test ranges, sandboxes and innovation hubs, but significant gaps remain, particularly for early-stage companies lacking institutional partnerships. Technological trend analyses consistently highlight the need for expanded testing infrastructures, emphasising real-world operational validation as a critical requirement for EDT maturity (NATO, 2025c).

Financing remains another structural challenge. Large-scale ecosystem studies based on 411,389 patents indicate that innovation success is strongly shaped by institutional ecosystems involving universities, research organisations and public subsidies, while SMEs tend to play a more limited role in patent performance outcomes (Stasik, 2026). Hardware-intensive DefenceTech ventures require significant capital, while software and dual-use firms often find it difficult to persuade traditional investors to fund defence applications due to perceived political, ethical or market-related risks (RAND Corporation, 2026). Empirical analyses of early-stage dual-use hardware ventures examining ten strategically important startups highlight the growing reliance on mixed financing structures combining public funding instruments and venture capital within DefenceTech ecosystems (McLeod, 2022). Interviews with venture capital actors highlight that European defence innovation ecosystems still face capital allocation imbalances, with public funding frequently directed toward established prime contractors rather than SMEs and early-stage startups (Atkinson, 2025).

Analyses of the European and transatlantic defence innovation landscape emphasise the persistence of investment gaps, particularly in the case of early-stage hardware ventures. These analyses also highlight the need for specialised public–private funds to close these gaps and enable scaling (European Parliament, 2023). Data-driven analyses of dual-use startup ecosystems based on SBIR and STTR programme datasets further demonstrate that structured public innovation programmes significantly influence long-term scaling trajectories and survival rates of emerging defence technology ventures (Ying, 2025). Structural capability differences remain significant, as policy analyses indicate that EU27 countries spend approximately seventeen times less on defence research and development than the United States, shaping the scale and tempo of European DefenceTech innovation ecosystems (European Commission, 2024c).

Finally, scaling up DefenceTech startups requires establishing trust and long-term relationships with defence institutions. Interview-based ecosystem research further emphasises that limited access to networks, unpredictable procurement timelines and financing gaps collectively constrain startups’ ability to scale within defence markets (Amir &amp; Rombach, 2025). This sector places a high value on reliability, security, compliance and operational continuity. startups must therefore deliver both technological innovation and institutional credibility, which requires structured engagement with defence users, rigorous certification processes, stable financing and long-term product roadmaps.

<strong><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;"><span class="fontstyle2">7. Structural and Institutional Barriers in DefenceTech Ecosystems</span></span></strong>

<span class="fontstyle0">This article set out to achieve two objectives: first, to reconstruct the definitional landscape surrounding university-related ventures across scholarship, international standards and university policies; and second, to propose clear operational definitions of “academic spin-off” and “academic spin-out” that can be used consistently in management research and institutional reporting. Both aims have been addressed. The integrative review and the side-by-side treatment of institutional anchors clarified how inclusion rules shape what is counted, while the VOS viewer co-occurrence mapping situated these choices within the thematic structure of recent scholarship since 2015. The resulting definitions make the boundary conditions explicit and translate directly into recordable descriptors for comparable datasets.</span>

<span class="fontstyle0">Treating “spin-off” (necessarily involving formal IP transfer at founding) and “spinout” (involving academic provenance without required IP transfer at founding) as complementary operational categories, and documenting four simple flags per case, builds a practical bridge between scholarly constructs and institutional measurement. The alignment with the EU’s shift from “intellectual property” to “intellectual assets” increases transparency and reduces benchmarking errors. With clear categories and auditable descriptors, comparative research becomes less fragile, institutional dashboards more informative, and policy design better matched to the heterogeneous realities of university-driven entrepreneurship.</span>

The structural barriers discussed in the previous section highlight the constraints faced by DefenceTech startups at the organisational level. Building on this perspective, the following analysis shifts towards the ecosystem scale, examining how institutional frameworks, regulatory regimes and policy instruments shape broader innovation dynamics. Rather than presenting additional barriers, export control systems, procurement architectures and security standards are analysed here as governance mechanisms that structure technological development, market access and collaboration patterns across the DefenceTech ecosystem.

At the ecosystem level, the rapid development of disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space and quantum technologies, and advanced communications systems has fundamentally changed the nature of defence and the relationship between the state, industry, and the innovation ecosystem. Process-oriented analyses of defence innovation emphasise that technological development should be understood as a continuum from early research to operational impact, embedded within stakeholder-driven innovation ecosystems rather than isolated organisational efforts (Carberry, 2023). The NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2022 clearly indicates that emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are both a source of new opportunities and significant risks to security, changing the nature of conflict and becoming one of the key areas of global competition (NATO, 2022). This structural dynamic is reinforced by the absence of formalised rapid acquisition mechanisms, which contributes to the so-called “valley of death” between technology demonstration and operational procurement identified by the European Commission (European Commission, 2025a).

The ecosystem dynamics described above are synthesised in Figure 1, which illustrates the multi-actor structure of the DefenceTech environment, the flow of capital between public and private stakeholders, and the critical transition points between research, testing, and operational deployment.

<img decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8638" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-f1.png" alt="" width="1093" height="1216" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-f1.png 1093w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-f1-270x300.png 270w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-f1-920x1024.png 920w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-f1-768x854.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1093px) 100vw, 1093px" />

DefenceTech is a specific segment of the innovative economy in which the pace of technological development is strongly determined by institutional and regulatory factors (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024b). Foresight-oriented defence policy analyses also emphasise that flexibility across multiple operational domains has become a central design principle shaping contemporary military innovation ecosystems. Rather than focusing on single-domain superiority, future capability planning increasingly prioritises adaptable and multi-role systems capable of operating across land, air, sea, cyber and space environments, reinforcing ecosystem-based approaches to defence innovation (Oitaku, 2021). Empirical analyses of 63,714 defence-related inventions show strong ecosystem concentration, with the twenty largest organisations accounting for around 40% of total innovation output and approximately 41% of inventions exhibiting dual-use characteristics, highlighting the structural dominance of key actors within DefenceTech innovation systems (Caviggioli, 2018).

Unlike civilian deep tech sectors, the successful implementation of innovation in the defence sector depends not only on the maturity of the technology, but also on its ability to pass through the public procurement system, security requirements, and export controls. At the ecosystem level, defence innovation trajectories are structured by regulatory regimes, procurement architectures and interoperability requirements.

The British Ministry of Defence’s industrial strategy indicates that the average time for a new supplier to enter the defence sector is a lengthy process fraught with significant procedural barriers. It is important to note that a key part of this period is taken up by procedures not directly related to technology development. These include, in particular, security certification of personnel and facilities, accreditation of IT systems, and complex and time-consuming public procurement procedures (UK Ministry of Defence, 2025). The document emphasizes that these barriers are institutional in nature and remain largely independent of the level of innovation of the solution offered.

At the same time, data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate a very high level of revenue concentration in the global arms industry. According to the SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies ranking, the total sales value of the 100 largest arms and military services manufacturers amounted to approximately USD 679 billion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2024a). Based on individual data published by SIPRI, it can be concluded that the ten largest companies generate approximately 50% of the total revenues of this group, which indicates a strong economic concentration among the largest entities in the sector. Longitudinal procurement data show that the number of unique Department of Defense suppliers declined from 79,993 in 2010 to 51,239 in 2019, while first-time vendors dropped from over 15,000 to just above 4,200, illustrating increasing structural barriers to entry within defence innovation ecosystems (Naval Postgraduate School, 2020b).

SIPRI emphasizes that this market structure favors the consolidation of dominant companies that have economies of scale, the ability to integrate complex weapons systems, and long-term relationships with public administrations. As a result, new entrants, including startups and small and medium-sized enterprises, most often enter the defence sector as subcontractors or suppliers of specialized components and technologies, rarely acting as prime integrators of complete system capabilities (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2024b).

As a governance instrument, export control remains the responsibility of EU member states, shaping market structure and influencing cross-border innovation pathways within the DefenceTech ecosystem (In-Q-Tel, 2026). Policy analyses of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base emphasise persistent fragmentation and limited cross-border collaboration, which structurally constrain innovation scaling across the ecosystem (Knudsen et al., 2025). The EU export control regime classifies technologies such as autonomous systems, advanced sensors, semiconductors and cyber tools as dual-use goods if they meet specific technical criteria (European Union, 2021), which results in licensing procedures, restrictions on knowledge transfer and regulatory fragmentation across national jurisdictions. Analyses by the European Parliamentary Research Service indicate that export control procedures may significantly extend commercialization timelines and influence technological design decisions already at the development stage, thereby structuring the conditions under which innovation emerges and scales across the European defence ecosystem (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024c).

At the ecosystem level, multi-year procurement cycles identified by the European Parliamentary Research Service and the European Defence Agency function as institutional mechanisms that structure capability development timelines and innovation trajectories (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024a). Procurement processes in the European Union, measured from the identification of an operational need to the achievement of full combat capability, often extend over many years and reflect the sequential nature of planning, financing and implementation of armament programmes. Public procurement based on capability-driven planning promotes interoperability, doctrinal alignment and stability in defence capability development, but simultaneously shapes the pace at which breakthrough technologies can be integrated into operational environments (European Defence Agency, 2023b). EPRS analyses indicate that the absence of formalised rapid acquisition mechanisms influences the absorption of solutions based on artificial intelligence, autonomy and cybersecurity, contributing to systemic gaps between technological experimentation and operational deployment (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025).

High security requirements operate as institutional safeguards that structure knowledge exchange and collaboration patterns within defence innovation ecosystems. Industrial security requirements in the defence sector cover not only the end product, but also personnel, IT infrastructure, physical facilities, and organizational processes (UK Cabinet Office, 2024). In practice, this means that DefenceTech projects may be subject to partial classification as early as the research and development stage, which significantly limits the possibility of cooperation with universities, civilian startups, and international research partners.

NATO documents indicate that the lack of interoperability of systems using artificial intelligence and autonomy is one of the key operational risks for multinational forces (NATO, 2012). Compliance with standards for command and control (C2) systems, data exchange, and cybersecurity is considered a key eligibility and evaluation criterion for projects in NATO innovation programs and related funding mechanisms (NATO, 2026). At the same time, NATO standardization documents emphasize that the integration of systems after the development phase is a costly, technically difficult process with high operational risk, which justifies the need to consider interoperability already at the design stage (NATO Standardization Office, 2024).

An analysis of the European Defence Fund’s results indicates that, in practice, financing is mainly focused on research and development projects at medium levels of technological readiness (typically TRL 3–6), with no mechanism for automatic transition to operational procurement (European Commission, 2025c). The European Commission identifies the so-called “valley of death” between technology demonstration and procurement as one of the key systemic barriers limiting the real impact of innovation on defence capabilities (European Commission, 2025a).

Table 2 synthesises the structural barriers identified in Section 6 with the governance instruments discussed in Section 7, highlighting their combined effects on DefenceTech ecosystem dynamics.

<img decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8637" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-t2.jpg" alt="" width="1183" height="945" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-t2.jpg 1183w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-t2-300x240.jpg 300w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-t2-1024x818.jpg 1024w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MINIB-2025_57_003-t2-768x613.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1183px) 100vw, 1183px" />

<span style="font-size: 18pt;"><strong><span class="fontstyle0"><span class="fontstyle2">8. The future of the DefenceTech</span></span></strong></span>

The future of the DefenceTech sector will be shaped by the rapid development of breakthrough technologies, in particular artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cybersecurity, space technologies, and, in the longer term, quantum technologies.These technologies increasingly emerge from civilian innovation ecosystems characterised by shorter development cycles, creating a persistent gap between technological advancement and the capacity of defence institutions to absorb new solutions. Both NATO and the European Union identify this gap as one of the key challenges for future defence readiness and technological superiority (European Commission, 2025d; NATO, 2025a).

In response to these trends, models of accelerated technology adoption, including accelerators, pilot programs, test environments, and early operational validation mechanisms, are gaining strategic importance. Rather than functioning solely as support instruments, these mechanisms increasingly act as governance tools that shorten the pathway from experimentation to potential deployment and reduce systemic investment risk. OECD analyses indicate that such solutions serve as “institutional testing grounds,” enabling the testing of new models of cooperation with the market and increasing the public sector’s capacity to absorb technologies developed outside the traditional industrial base (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2024).

An important element of the future DefenceTech ecosystem will be the growing role of startups and SMEs, particularly in the areas of AI, cyber, and space. Recent ecosystem studies indicate that startups increasingly occupy niche roles within defence capability development due to faster innovation cycles compared to traditional contractors (Amir &amp; Rombach, 2025). EU white papers and reports emphasize that these entities are a key source of innovation, but at the same time they most often encounter barriers related to procurement procedures, export regulations, and the lack of stable paths from demonstrator to production contract. Without addressing these structural constraints, publicly funded innovation risks remaining confined to pilot stages rather than translating into deployable defence capabilities (European Commission, 2025d; European Commission, 2024b).

From an ecosystem perspective, the findings suggest that accelerated experimentation frameworks, closer alignment between innovation instruments and capability planning, and stronger coordination at allied and EU levels are likely to shape future DefenceTech governance trajectories. DefenceTech is therefore increasingly framed not only as an industrial sector but as a systemic innovation domain where technological competitiveness, security and institutional resilience intersect.

The findings further demonstrate that DefenceTech innovation ecosystems are structured by interdependent organisational and institutional dynamics. Institutional barriers, including procurement timelines, export controls and security requirements, continue to influence ecosystem functioning, while startups emerge as central innovation actors requiring structured integration within defence institutions. At the same time, financing models increasingly reflect hybrid public–private investment approaches, and successful technology adoption depends on coordinated collaboration across armed forces, industry and innovation intermediaries. From a governance perspective, policymakers should prioritise rapid experimentation frameworks, investors should adapt to longer defence innovation cycles, and accelerators should align more closely with procurement structures.

Future research should focus on empirical evaluation of DefenceTech ecosystems, comparative analysis of NATO and EU innovation mechanisms, and the measurement of long-term innovation outcomes.

<span style="font-size: 18pt;"><strong><span class="fontstyle0"><span class="fontstyle2">9. Conclusions</span></span></strong></span>

This article has addressed the question of how startups, financing mechanisms and acceleration instruments jointly shape technology adoption pathways within DefenceTech innovation ecosystems. The review demonstrates that startups have become central actors in defence innovation, particularly in software, AI and dual-use domains, yet remain structurally disadvantaged by procurement timelines, regulatory burdens and limited access to testing environments. Financing models are gradually adapting to these realities through hybrid public–private instruments, though capital allocation imbalances persist. Acceleration programmes such as NATO DIANA and EUDIS represent meaningful institutional responses, but their systemic impact remains nascent. The key theoretical contribution of this study lies in integrating these dimensions into a coherent analytical framework that treats the DefenceTech ecosystem as a co-evolutionary structure shaped by interdependent organisational, institutional and financial dynamics, an approach that has been underrepresented in the fragmented prior literature. These findings have direct implications for policymakers, investors and accelerators seeking to strengthen the absorptive capacity of defence innovation ecosystems.

<span style="font-size: 18pt;"><strong><span class="fontstyle0"><span class="fontstyle2">10. Limitations</span></span></strong></span>

This study synthesises heterogeneous academic and policy sources rather than a single empirical dataset, which limits direct comparability between findings. The analysis focuses primarily on European and transatlantic DefenceTech ecosystems, reducing global generalisability. In addition, available data capture formal structures and policy instruments more effectively than informal or classified innovation activities.

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U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). Responsible artificial intelligence strategy and implementation pathway. Washington, D.C. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-Responsible-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.pdf
U.S. Department of Defense. (2023). Joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) strategy. Washington, D.C.
UK Cabinet Office. (2024). National security vetting. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-security-vetting
UK Ministry of Defence. (2025). Defence industrial strategy: Making defence an engine for growth. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68bea3fc223d92d088f01d69/Defence_Industrial_Strategy_2025_-_Making_Defence_an_Engine_for_Growth.pdf
UK Ministry of Defence. (2026). Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA). https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-and-security-accelerator
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (2024). Quantum technology, peace and security. https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/UNIDIR_quantum_technology.pdf--></p>
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		<title>Spin-off vs. spin-out: a dual-category approach and minimal descriptors for comparable research and policy</title>
		<link>https://minib.pl/en/numer/no-2-2025/spin-off-vs-spin-out-a-dual-category-approach-and-minimal-descriptors-for-comparable-research-and-policy/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[create24]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2025 10:41:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[academic entrepreneurship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CEE.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intellectual assets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[measurement comparability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spin-outs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology transfer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[university spin-offs]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://minib.pl/?post_type=numer&#038;p=8509</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[1. Introduction University-affiliated new ventures, commonly labelled “spin-offs” or “spin-outs,” have long been one of the salient channels through which knowledge travels from higher education institutions (HEIs) and public research organizations (PROs) into markets. Historically, the co-evolution of science, technology, and economic development has repeatedly hinged on such translation mechanisms, from early industrialization to the...]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;">1. Introduction</span></strong></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">University-affiliated new ventures, commonly labelled “spin-offs” or “spin-outs,” have long been one of the salient channels through which knowledge travels from higher education institutions (HEIs) and public research organizations (PROs) into markets. Historically, the co-evolution of science, technology, and economic development has repeatedly hinged on such translation mechanisms, from early industrialization to the contemporary knowledge economy (Smith, 1776; Landes, 1969; Soete &amp; Freeman, 1997; Mokyr, 2002). In the modern era, the “third mission” of universities has elevated knowledge transfer and commercialization alongside education and research, embedding entrepreneurial roles within the institutional fabric of HEIs (e.g. Perkmann et al., 2021; Audretsch, 2014). This evolution is reflected in the literature on the entrepreneurial university and regional innovation systems, which documents how universities, firms, and government agencies co-produce innovation outcomes (e.g., Etzkowitz &amp; Leydesdorff, 1997; Secundo et al., 2017; Compagnucci &amp; Spigarelli, 2020; Guerrero et al., 2024). Within this landscape, university spin-offs and spin-outs constitute a visible and often contested bridge between laboratory and market.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">Despite their prominence, terminology and operational practice remain heterogeneous. Labels such as “spin-off,” “spin-out,” “academic start-up,” or “university-based new technology firm” are used inconsistently across scholarly, legal and institutional contexts (Pirnay et al., 2003; Hogan &amp; Zhou, 2010; Miranda et al., 2018). The definitional ambiguity is not merely semantic. When different studies count different underlying populations, some focusing on ventures that license or receive assignments of university intellectual property (IP), others on ventures whose advantage rests on academic human capital and tacit knowledge, empirical results become difficult to cumulate, and policy evaluations can be misleading (Pirnay et al., 2003; Rubini et al., 2021; Dabić et al., 2022). Bibliometric overviews likewise show a fragmented discourse spanning technology transfer, entrepreneurial teams, regional development, and institutional design, with shifting emphases after 2015, and particularly after 2020, as software- and data-intensive ventures gained salience (Perkmann et al., 2021).</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">Heterogeneity is reinforced by divergent operational standards. In the United States, the post-Bayh–Dole regime (1980) institutionalized university IP ownership and spurred technology transfer structures, shaping what is counted and reported (Mowery, 2005; Berman, 2008; O’Shea et al., 2008; Kenney &amp; Patton, 2011). The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) has, for reporting purposes, defined “startup company” narrowly as a firm formed specifically to develop university-licensed technology – a convention that enhances comparability but excludes IP-light trajectories (Bray &amp; Lee, <span class="fontstyle0">2000; AUTM, 2024). In Europe, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission (EC) have promoted measurement frameworks historically centered on formal IP channels; more recent EU guidance broadens the focus from “IP” to “intellectual assets,” explicitly including software and data in knowledge-valorization strategies (Council of the European Union, 2022; European Commission, 2023). The UK’s Independent Review of University Spin-outs and the UK government’s response highlight standard-setting pressures around equity, licensing, and transaction speed, with implications for how universities identify and support ventures (Ulrichsen et al., 2022; Tracey &amp; Williamson, 2023). These institutional choices shape samples, metrics, and incentives, and thus indirectly the evidence base in scholarship (Colombo et al., 2010; Clarysse et al., 2011; Algieri et al., 2013; O’Reilly et al., 2018).</span></span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2"><span class="fontstyle0">Context matters as well. In Poland and other Central and Eastern European (CEE) systems, legal-institutional architectures differ from Anglo-American practice, including the prominent role of special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) for indirect commercialization and specific provisions of national higher-education law (Polish Law on Higher Education and Science, 2018; Konopka-Cupiał, 2020). Such arrangements can blur the operational boundary between the university and the venture, complicating both institutional reporting and cross-country benchmarking. Comparative research has shown that university strategies, technology transfer offices (TTOs), and local entrepreneurial infrastructures condition the incidence and trajectories of university-related ventures (Mustar et al., 2006; Colombo et al., 2010; Bigliardi et al., 2013). Recent reviews stress the need to align operational definitions with these institutional realities, particularly for software- and data-driven venture paths (Perkmann et al., 2021; Dabić et al., 2022; Tracey &amp; Williamson, 2023).</span></span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2"><span class="fontstyle0">Against this background, the article pursues two tightly defined aims. First, it reconstructs the definitional landscape across management scholarship, international organizations – the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission (EC) – and university policies, with particular weight given to post-2020 contributions alongside canonical sources (Pirnay et al., 2003; Shane, 2004; Clarysse &amp; Moray, 2004; Perkmann et al., 2013; Cerver Romero et al., 2021). Second, it proposes clear operational definitions of “spin-offs” and “spin-outs” suitable for use in management and technology transfer research and in institutional practice, with attention to the realities of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).</span></span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2"><span class="fontstyle0">The article addresses the following research questions (RQs): </span></span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2"><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">RQ1: Which definitional choices and operational criteria permit a consistent distinction to be drawn between spin-offs and spin-outs in management research and in institutional statistics?</span> </span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">RQ2: How do international standards and national regulatory arrangements (OECD/EC/AUTM; Bayh–Dole-type provisions; country-specific solutions in CEE) influence those definitions and the ways universities and intermediaries identify and report university-related ventures?</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">RQ3: Which thematic structures dominate in recent literature (post-2015/2020), and how do they relate to definitional and operational choices identified in the review?</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">RQ4: What implications follow for measurement, university practice (including the design of TTO processes and decision rights), and public policy, with a focus on Poland and the wider CEE region?</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The contribution is threefold. Conceptually, the article consolidates disparate definitional families into a usable map that clarifies what is counted under each label and why (Miranda et al., 2018; Dabić et al., 2022). Operationally, it specifies a classification protocol – comprising decision rules and documentation flags – that researchers and institutions can apply when assembling datasets, thereby improving comparability without erasing legitimate diversity across contexts (Colombo et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2018; European Commission, 2023). Empirically, it anchors these proposals in an up-todate view of the field by means of a VOSviewer co-occurrence analysis of Scopus-indexed publications, aligning the operational treatment with contemporary research themes (Perkmann et al., 2021).</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The remainder of the article proceeds in three steps. The next section reviews scholarly and institutional sources, tracing how definitions have been formulated and operationalized in research and reporting, and what consequences follow for sampling, metrics and inference. The following section then presents the design and results of the VOSviewer analysis (data source, query, inclusion criteria, normalization, visualization), used here to locate the study’s operational proposals within recent thematic structures. The discussion then integrates insights from both streams to advance operational definitions of “spin-off” / “spin-out” and to elaborate their implications for measurement, university practice and policy, especially in Poland and the broader CEE context. The article concludes by summarizing the contribution and outlining directions for future research.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">This structure has two ambitions. First, to increase the clarity and usefulness of definitions so that research on spin-offs and spin-outs yields results that are comparable across countries, disciplines and time periods. Second, to anchor definitional choices in the post-2020 empirical map of the field, showing where scholarly attention concentrates, which themes are expanding and which are receding, and how these dynamics should inform university practices and the design of policy instruments.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;">2. Literature review: definitions, operational practice, and recent shifts</span></strong></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">The definitional landscape revolves around three well-established families that adopt different “entry points” into what counts as a university spin-off/spin-out. An IP-centric tradition defines the category through codified intellectual property and formal transfer (license or assignment), with Shane’s (2004) definition: “a new firm created to exploit IP developed within a university” providing the sharpest operational pivot and travelling well to performance studies (Nerkar &amp; Shane, 2003). A broader, knowledge-based tradition includes ventures whose advantage originates in university research and teams even without formal IP conveyance; it emphasizes founder roles and relational coupling to the higher education institution (HEI) (Pirnay et al., 2003; Nicolaou &amp; Birley, 2003; Clarysse &amp; Moray, 2004). A third line differentiates ventures by initial resource bundles and technology/product maturity at founding, anticipating systematic differences in capital needs and risk across deep-tech versus service/software paths (Heirman &amp; Clarysse, 2004; Mustar et al., 2006). Table 1 consolidates these canonical treatments in a uniform format, pairing each concise formulation with its key construct and the implied consequences for inclusion and exclusion in the empirical samples.</span></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8560" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-01.png" alt="" width="776" height="986" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-01.png 776w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-01-236x300.png 236w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-01-768x976.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 776px) 100vw, 776px" /></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Read horizontally, Table 1 reveals three regularities that matter for inference. First, IPcentric sharpness increases comparability by constraining heterogeneity, but it does so by design at the cost of excluding tacit-knowledge and software/data trajectories that leave a weaker IP trail. Second, relational typologies centered on founder roles and the strength of HEI-venture coupling furnish natural descriptors for case characterization and help explain divergent growth paths; yet they require explicit boundary choices to avoid pooling non-comparable populations. Third, maturity-based taxonomies imply that outcomes commonly analyzed in the literature – time-to-market, survival, and financing – are sensitive to mixing classes with fundamentally different capital intensity and technological uncertainty. Taken together, the very constructs that give explanatory traction – asset type, institutional linkage, and founder configuration – also shift the operational meaning of “spin-off” / “spin-out,” which is why nominally similar studies often observe different populations (Perkmann et al., 2013, 2021; Dabić et al., 2022). This observation provides the hinge for the next step: how scholarly categories are filtered, codified, and sometimes narrowed by reporting conventions.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The post-Bayh–Dole architecture in the United States institutionalized university IP ownership, structured TTO activity, and shaped what gets counted (Stevens, 2004; Mowery, 2005; Berman, 2008; O’Shea et al., 2008). For reporting, AUTM defines a “startup company” narrowly as a firm formed specifically to develop university-licensed technology, an inclusion rule that produces high internal consistency but systematically Excludes ip-light trajectories (bray &amp; lee, 2000; autm, 2024). Nevertheless, the definitional problem is global: systematic literature reviews reveal similar tensions between formal IPcentric definitions and knowledge-based deep-tech pathways in diverse international contexts (Verma et al., 2022). In Europe, OECD and EC frameworks historically privileged formal IP channels for comparability; however, the 2022 Council Recommendation on knowledge valorization and the 2023 EC Code of Practice on intellectual assets broaden the object from “IP” to “intellectual assets,” explicitly recognizing software and data (Council of the European Union, 2022; European Commission, 2023). In the UK, the Independent Review of University Spin-outs and the government response push for more transparent equity, licensing norms and faster transactions, effectively reshaping operational practice at the university–investor interface (Ulrichsen et al., 2022; Tracey &amp; Williamson, 2023). Table 2 assembles these contemporary institutional anchors and, crucially, specifies how their wording translates into inclusion and exclusion at scale (Council of the European Union, 2022; Ulrichsen et al., 2022; European Commission, 2023; Tracey &amp; Williamson, 2023). </span></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8561" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-02.png" alt="" width="784" height="586" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-02.png 784w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-02-300x224.png 300w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-02-768x574.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 784px) 100vw, 784px" /></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Read against the scholarly families, Table 2 makes clear that operational regimes do not merely </span><span class="fontstyle2">reflect </span><span class="fontstyle0">definitions; they actively </span><span class="fontstyle2">shape </span><span class="fontstyle0">the population that is rendered visible. The AUTM convention, counting as “startup company” only firms formed to develop </span><span class="fontstyle2">licensed </span><span class="fontstyle0">university technology, maximizes internal consistency yet structurally underrepresents software/data and know-how trajectories without a formal license, even when their knowledge base is unmistakably academic. The recent EU shift from “intellectual property” to “intellectual assets” widens the object of valorization to include software and data, thereby legitimizing a broader set of university-related ventures for institutional tracking. The UK review, by pressing for transparent equity norms and faster deals, alters incentives at the university-investor interface and is likely to affect not only deal flow but also how universities </span><span class="fontstyle2">label </span><span class="fontstyle0">and </span><span class="fontstyle2">count </span><span class="fontstyle0">ventures.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">These institutional anchors therefore generate distinct measurement windows. A narrow license-based window is well suited to TTO performance dashboards and interinstitutional benchmarking where legal clarity is paramount; a broader intellectual-assets window is better aligned with the evolving economics of research commercialization, where software, data and hybrid channels have become first-class objects. For crossnational research – particularly when comparing the United States with Europe, or generalizing to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – recognizing which window is in use is a prerequisite for meaningful inference. Otherwise, studies labelled “spin-off” may, in practice, be sampling dissimilar, non-comparable populations, with predictable divergence in outcomes, funding paths, and timelines.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Research on mechanisms complements definitional work by explaining why ventures unfold differently across contexts. University strategy and TTO human capital correlate with spin-off propensity and quality (Colombo et al., 2010; Clarysse et al., 2011), while incubation and science parks have mixed, lifecycle-contingent effects (Mian, 1997; McAdam &amp; McAdam, 2008; Schwartz, 2011; Pauwels et al., 2016). Entrepreneurial teams and role configurations matter for speed and survival (Clarysse &amp; Moray, 2004; Ensley &amp; Hmieleski, 2005; Walter et al., 2006; Iacobucci et al., 2011). Finance and contracting structures shape selection and growth under risk (Kaplan &amp; Strömberg, 2003; Gilson &amp; Schizer, 2003; Lockett &amp; Wright, 2005). Importantly, these mechanisms interact with definitional filters: an AUTM-compatible sample, by construction, tends to over-represent ventures with licensable IP, different TTO touchpoints, and often different financing trajectories, compared with samples centered on academic founder affiliation.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Performance evidence is heterogeneous by design because samples are heterogeneous. Some studies link university reputation and networks to venture performance (Goethner et al., 2012), others document productivity differences between spin-offs and other NTBFs (Ortín-Ángel &amp; Vendrell-Herrero, 2014), and meta-reviews caution against naive benchmarking when definitions diverge (Bigliardi et al., 2013; Rodríguez-Gulías et al., 2016). Regional development effects vary with institutional thickness and prior industryscience ties (Benneworth &amp; Charles, 2005; Vincett, 2010; Pinheiro et al., 2015). Again, what is “in sample” depends on the definitional window.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The most consequential evolution in the last decade is the recognition of software- and data-intensive ventures as first-class objects of commercialization and of hybrid channels beyond license-then-incorporate. Scholarly reviews register this broadening (Perkmann et al., 2021; Dabić et al., 2022), bibliometric analyses map a dispersion of themes from IP/licensing to ecosystems, and finance and policy documents codify the language of “intellectual assets,” encouraging institutions to adapt support and metrics (Council of the European Union, 2022; European Commission, 2023; Tracey &amp; Williamson, 2023). This shift is particularly important for CEE systems, where indirect commercialization via special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) and national legal solutions (e.g., Poland’s highereducation law) blur simple license-based categories (Konopka-Cupiał, 2020), and where software-driven ventures may lack the IP “footprint” required by narrow reporting conventions despite strong academic provenance.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Placing scholarly families (Table 1) alongside institutional definitions (Table 2) clarifies two persistent but tractable tensions. First, the reporting logic seeks crisp inclusion rules for accountability, whereas the explanatory logic seeks constructs that capture real heterogeneity in origins, resources, and governance. Second, post-2020 changes have opened a gap – now acknowledged in EU guidance – between patent-centric windows and the reality of software/data assets. The way forward is not to choose one logic over the other but to translate between them in transparent ways.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">For analytical clarity, the matrix is reduced to three definitional lenses that dominate the literature, with the institutional anchors mapping onto them (AUTM aligns with the IP-centric lens; the EU’s “intellectual assets” shift partially bridges to the knowledge-based lens; recent UK guidance tunes equity/coupling within the knowledge-based logic).</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">A concise reading of Table 3 shows that the field revolves around three complementary lenses rather than competing definitions. The IP-centric, license-based lens delivers the sharpest boundary conditions and the highest internal consistency, because inclusion hinges on a verifiable legal act. Its strength is precisely its weakness: by privileging patentable outputs and formal transfers, it systematically blindsides software- and dataintensive ventures and tacit-knowledge trajectories that now account for a growing share of university-related entrepreneurship. The knowledge- or founder-linked lens restores that missing breadth by anchoring the category in academic provenance and the relational coupling between founders and the higher education institution. As a result, it captures</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">the organizational and behavioral mechanisms emphasized in the literature: team composition, autonomy, and the intensity of university support, but at the price of greater heterogeneity unless boundary conditions are made explicit. The maturity and resourcebased lens cuts the phenomenon along a third axis: technology and product readiness, highlighting why financing patterns, time-to-market and survival rates are not directly comparable across deep-tech and software or service subclasses. </span></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8562" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-03.png" alt="" width="780" height="728" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-03.png 780w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-03-300x280.png 300w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-t-03-768x717.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 780px) 100vw, 780px" /></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Seen together, the three lenses map directly onto current governance shifts. The EU’s move from “intellectual property” to “intellectual assets” reduces the principal blind spot of the first lens by legitimizing software and data as first-class commercialization objects, while the UK spin-out review primarily sharpens equity and relational practices within the second lens. None of the lenses is sufficient on its own: the license-based window is</span> <span class="fontstyle0">optimal for accountability and benchmarking; the founder-linked window is better aligned with explanatory work on emergence and growth; and the maturity lens is indispensable whenever outcomes hinge on capital intensity and technological uncertainty. For cross-national analyses, particularly where Central and Eastern European arrangements (e.g., indirect commercialization via special-purpose vehicles) complicate straightforward license-based tests, the matrix clarifies which “measurement window” is in play and what it leaves out.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">This synthesis also provides a bridge to the empirical parts of the paper. It explains why co-occurrence structures in recent literature are expected to cluster around IP/licensing, founder coupling and resources/maturity, and it frames the proposed operational definitions: they should be explicit about which lens they instantiate and which exclusions they imply, so that findings remain interpretable and comparable across institutional contexts.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Taken together, the three lenses clarify what each definition renders visible and where blind spots remain. They also generate concrete expectations about the structure of current scholarship: a license/IP cluster anchored by patents, research commercialization and TTOs; a founder-HEI coupling cluster organized around academic entrepreneurship</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">and relational ties; a resources/maturity cluster that shades into deep-tech versus software trajectories; and adjacent clusters reflecting finance/policy and ecosystem governance. The next section tests these expectations with an exploratory co-occurrence mapping of recent publications indexed in Scopus (articles and reviews, 2015–2025; n = 322), using VOSviewer to identify clusters and an overlay to trace temporal emphasis.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Throughout the bibliometric analysis, the term “spin-off/spin-out” is used as indexed in Scopus records, reflecting authors’ and databases’ labelling practices; the more precise definitional distinctions developed in this article are applied in the conceptual and operational sections rather than retrofitted to the raw indexing. To mitigate synonymy and indexing noise (e.g., “spin-off,” “spinoff,” “spin-out”) and to suppress generic methodological terms, the VOSviewer mapping employs a simple thesaurus that unifies closely related expressions and removes non-informative keywords.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><span class="fontstyle2" style="font-size: 18pt;">3. Co-occurrence mapping of recent scholarship (VOSviewer, 2015– 2025)</span></strong></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The bibliometric exercise reported herein was designed to serve one purpose: to test empirically whether the most recent scholarship on university spin-offs and spin-outs does indeed cluster along the axes distilled from the literature review: intellectual property and licensing; founder roles and affiliation; resources and infrastructure; policy and</span> <span class="fontstyle0">institutional environment; and finance/industry context. The analysis is therefore complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the conceptual synthesis and the institutional definitions.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The dataset was exported from Scopus and limited to journal articles and reviews indexed between 2015 and 2025, whose titles, abstracts, or author/index keywords contained </span><span class="fontstyle2">spin-off/spinoff </span><span class="fontstyle0">or </span><span class="fontstyle2">spin-out/spinout </span><span class="fontstyle0">combined with an academic context (university; academic; public research organization) and transfer/commercialization vocabulary (technology transfer; commercialization/commercialization; licensing; intellectual property; knowledge transfer/exchange). Subject areas were restricted to Business, Management and Accounting; Economics and Econometrics; and Social Sciences, reflecting the primary audiences of management and technology transfer research, while acknowledging the deep-tech overlap captured through Engineering in the conceptual review. The resulting set comprised 322 records. A light thesaurus was used to harmonize obvious variants and synonyms (e.g., </span><span class="fontstyle2">spin-off/spinoff/spin off </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle2">spin-off; spin-out/spinout/spin out </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle2">spin-out; tech transfer </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle2">technology transfer; commercialisation </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle2">commercialization; IPR/IP rights </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle2">intellectual property</span><span class="fontstyle0">; </span><span class="fontstyle2">TTO/TTOs </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle2">technology transfer office</span><span class="fontstyle0">). Generic terms (e.g., </span><span class="fontstyle2">article</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">case study</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">introduction</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">methodology</span><span class="fontstyle0">) were excluded. Co-occurrence mapping was conducted in VOSviewer using all keywords (author and </span><span class="fontstyle0">index terms), full counting, and association-strength normalization. The minimum occurrence threshold was set at six to balance noise reduction and coverage. The resulting network resolves into five coherent clusters, which are consistent with the definitional lenses and institutional windows discussed earlier:</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">A first cluster centers on operationalization of technology transfer, integrating terms such as </span><span class="fontstyle2">technology transfer, technology transfer office, research/commercialization, patents and inventions, and public policy</span><span class="fontstyle0">, together with terms relating to economic and social effects. This cluster is the measurement-and-implementation spine of the field, closest to university governance and reporting.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">A second cluster organizes around institutions and ecosystems: </span><span class="fontstyle2">universities and higher education institutions (HEIs), academic spin-offs/spin-outs, networks, knowledge management, entrepreneurial ecosystems</span><span class="fontstyle0">, and </span><span class="fontstyle2">third mission </span><span class="fontstyle0">alongside intellectual property. This is the institutional-relational space where founder affiliation, organizational coupling to the HEI, and access to resources are theorized and observed.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">A third cluster links finance and regional development: </span><span class="fontstyle2">venture capital, investments, finance/economics, policy makers</span><span class="fontstyle0">, and </span><span class="fontstyle2">regional development/planning</span><span class="fontstyle0">. It is the policyfinance interface where instruments, capital structures, and place-based outcomes cohere.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">A fourth cluster forms the definitional core: </span><span class="fontstyle2">spin-off</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">startup</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">knowledge transfer</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">patent</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">entrepreneurial university</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">triple helix</span><span class="fontstyle0">, and </span><span class="fontstyle2">entrepreneurial orientation</span><span class="fontstyle0">. Notably, patent appears as a bridging concept with a dual role – as both a theoretical label and a connector to operational practice in Cluster 1.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">A fifth cluster gathers entrepreneurship and innovation themes in higher education: </span><span class="fontstyle2">entrepreneur/entrepreneurship</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">higher education</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">innovation/innovation policy</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">research and development (R&amp;D)</span><span class="fontstyle0">, and the </span><span class="fontstyle2">university sector</span><span class="fontstyle0">. It connects the field to general entrepreneurship and innovation management scholarship focused on HEIs.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">An overlay visualization (average publication year) indicates a relative recentering of attention on ecosystems, networks, and financing (</span><span class="fontstyle2">entrepreneurial ecosystems</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">networks</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">venture capital</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">spin-outs</span><span class="fontstyle0">) while technology transfer and academic entrepreneurship remain persistently central. This temporal shading mirrors the post-2020 broadening documented in the review, toward software/data assets, equity norms, and ecosystem governance, without displacing the long-standing IP/licensing backbone.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Interpreted against the axes developed earlier, the clusters align in a near-one-to-one fashion. The intellectual property/licensing axis manifests primarily in Clusters 1 and 4 (</span><span class="fontstyle2">technology transfer office</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">commercialization</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">patent</span><span class="fontstyle0">). Founder roles and affiliation are anchored in Cluster 2 (</span><span class="fontstyle2">academic spin-offs/spin-outs</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">universities/HEIs</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">networks</span><span class="fontstyle0">), where relational coupling to the HEI is most salient. Resources and infrastructure appear in Clusters 1 and 2 (</span><span class="fontstyle2">TTOs</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">knowledge management</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">third mission</span><span class="fontstyle0">), reflecting access to laboratories, data, and support services. Policy and institutional environment is shared between Clusters 1 and 3 (p</span><span class="fontstyle2">ublic policy</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">policy makers</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">regional development</span><span class="fontstyle0">). Finance/industry context spans Clusters 3 and 5 (</span><span class="fontstyle2">venture capital</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">investments</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">innovation policy</span><span class="fontstyle0">, </span><span class="fontstyle2">research and development</span><span class="fontstyle0">). This mapping empirically supports the need to translate between IP-centered operational windows and knowledge-/founder-centered explanatory frames when designing samples and reporting results.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Two aspects of the structure are worth highlighting because they inform the operational definitions proposed later. First, the centrality of </span><span class="fontstyle2">technology transfer </span><span class="fontstyle0">and </span><span class="fontstyle2">patent </span><span class="fontstyle0">within the definitional core implies that IP-centric windows will continue to dominate dashboard metrics and comparative reporting; the overlay’s more recent emphasis on ecosystems and finance suggests, however, that sampling frames which rely exclusively on license-based inclusion risk missing a growing share of economically relevant cases, especially software- and data-intensive trajectories. Second, the adjacency of HEI/network terms to venture capital and regional development underscores that founder-HEI coupling is not merely a governance descriptor; it shapes finance ability and the placebased outcomes on which policy is evaluated. </span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The analysis is subject to the usual caveats. Keyword-based co-occurrence depends on authors’ and indexers’ labelling practices; software/data/AI trajectories may be underrepresented when not explicitly tagged, especially in management outlets, which makes results sensitive to thresholding and normalization choices. Field restrictions involve a trade-off between precision and recall: excluding large parts of Engineering reduces noise but risks missing deep-tech niches that publish outside management journals. Scopus coverage and English-language bias are additional constraints. Within these limits, the structure is stable to modest parameter changes (e.g., a threshold of five or seven occurrences produces the same five clusters with small boundary shifts) and is congruent with the conceptual review and the institutional definitions, thereby providing a defensible empirical base for the operational proposals.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Figure 1a (network view) displays five color-coded clusters with the densest linkages around technology transfer/patent (Clusters 1 and 4) and ecosystem/finance nodes (Clusters 2 and 3). Figure 1b (overlay) shades nodes by average publication year, with ecosystem- and finance-related terms skewing more recent relative to the enduring centrality of technology transfer and academic entrepreneurship.</span></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8563" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-1.png" alt="" width="624" height="533" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-1.png 624w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-1-300x256.png 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 624px) 100vw, 624px" /></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8564" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-1b.png" alt="" width="597" height="530" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-1b.png 597w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-1b-300x266.png 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 597px) 100vw, 597px" /></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Based on Scopus records (</span><span class="fontstyle2">n </span><span class="fontstyle0">= 322) indexed in 2015–2025, filtered to journal articles/reviews with spin-off/spinout terms in titles/abstracts/keywords and an academic + technology-transfer/commercialization context (Business; Economics/Econometrics; Social Sciences). Co-occurrence mapping was conducted in VOSviewer using full counting, association-strength normalization, and a ≥ 6 keyword threshold. A light thesaurus harmonized common variants (e.g., spinoff </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle0">spin-off; spinout </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle0">spin-out; tech transfer </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle0">technology transfer; IPR </span><span class="fontstyle3">→ </span><span class="fontstyle0">intellectual property) and removed generic terms. </span><span class="fontstyle2">Source: </span><span class="fontstyle0">Original analysis of Scopus data using VOSviewer (CWTS, Leiden University). See Van Eck &amp; Waltman (2010).</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The resulting mapping reveals a structure of current scholarship centered on the same conceptual and operational tensions identified in the review, namely IP/licensing versus knowledge-/founder-based logics, resource and infrastructure access, and policy/finance governance. This provides a strong empirical warrant for the next section, which states explicit operational definitions of “spin-off” and “spin-out” and translates them into inclusion rules that make sampling and metrics portable across institutional contexts.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;">4. Discussion and synthesis</span></strong></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">By matching canonical scholarship with institutional standards and the VOS viewer evidence, this study confirms that the ambiguity surrounding “spin-off” and “spin-out” is structural rather than incidental. As we have sought to show, complementary logics organize the field. A legal and statistical logic, exemplified by AUTM reporting conventions and long-standing OECD/EC frameworks, maximizes measurability and legal certainty by tying inclusion to verifiable acts such as license, assignment, or equity (Shane, 2004; OECD, 2003; OECD/Eurostat, 2005; AUTM definitions 2021–2024). Its strength is crisp comparability; its price is reductionism that filters out tacit-knowledge, software- and dataintensive, and other IP-light trajectories that now constitute a material share of academic venturing. A socio-scientific logic, rooted in broader definitions and process typologies, captures heterogeneity in origins, team roles, and organizational coupling to higher education institutions (HEIs), but is harder to operationalize consistently across institutions and countries (Rappert et al., 1999; Pirnay et al., 2003; Nicolaou &amp; Birley, 2003; Heirman &amp; Clarysse, 2004). Recent syntheses sharpen this divide by distinguishing academic engagement from commercialization sensu stricto and by explicitly recognizing software and data as first-class objects of valorization (Perkmann et al., 2021; Dabić et al., 2022). Policy has begun to move accordingly: the Council Recommendation on knowledge valorization (2022) and the Commission’s Code of Practice on intellectual assets (2023) reframe the object from “intellectual property” to “intellectual assets,” while the UK’s spinout review and government response recalibrate equity norms and transaction practice (Council of the EU, 2022; European Commission, 2023; Tracey &amp; Williamson, 2023; Ulrichsen et al., 2022).</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">The bibliometric map for 2015–2025 (</span><span class="fontstyle3">n </span><span class="fontstyle2">= 322 Scopus articles and reviews; Figures 1a-1b) renders these tensions as five stable clusters: a technology transfer operations cluster (TTOs, licensing, patents); an institutions and ecosystems cluster (</span><span class="fontstyle3">HEIs, third mission, networks, knowledge management, intellectual property as a resource</span><span class="fontstyle2">); a finance and development policy cluster (</span><span class="fontstyle3">venture capital, investments, policy makers, regional development/planning</span><span class="fontstyle2">); a definitional core (</span><span class="fontstyle3">spin-off, entrepreneurial university, triple helix, entrepreneurial orientation</span><span class="fontstyle2">); and a highereducation entrepreneurship/innovation cluster. The overlay visualization indicates post-2020 cooling-off of purely patent-centric themes and relatively newer attention to ecosystems, networks and financing, while technology transfer remains central. For Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where indirect commercialization via special-purpose vehicles and national legal solutions (e.g., Poland’s higher-education law) complicate simple license tests, the divergence between the two logics is particularly visible and directly affects what enters institutional statistics (Konopka-Cupiał, 2020).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><strong><span class="fontstyle0">5. Operational definitions and a lightweight classification checklist</span></strong></span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">To translate between explanatory richness and reporting clarity, the following two operational categories are proposed:</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle3">Academic spin-off: </span><span class="fontstyle2">a newly incorporated firm created to commercialize formally identified intellectual property developed within an HEI or public research organization (PRO), to which the firm acquires legal title </span><span class="fontstyle4">via </span><span class="fontstyle2">license, assignment, or in-kind contribution; at least one founder is affiliated with the HEI/PRO at founding, and the HEI-venture relationship is visible in a contract or ownership structure (Shane, 2004; AUTM reporting practice; OECD/EC comparability aims).</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle3">Academic spin-out: </span><span class="fontstyle2">a newly incorporated firm founded by current or former members of the academic community whose advantage primarily derives from knowledge, capabilities or artefacts developed within an HEI/PRO; no formal transfer of IP from the HEI/PRO is required at founding, and access to institutional resources (equipment, data, software) may occur on market terms. This category explicitly admits IP-light software/data trajectories documented in recent literature and now recognized in EU guidance (Dabić et al., 2022; Council of the EU, 2022; European Commission, 2023).</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">For comparability, each case should be accompanied by four minimal flags recorded at the unit level:</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">• </span><span class="fontstyle2">asset type at founding (patent/prototype/software/data),</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">• </span><span class="fontstyle2">HEI-venture linkage (license/equity/none),</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">• </span><span class="fontstyle2">access to HEI resources (infrastructure/data/none),</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">• </span><span class="fontstyle2">source of initial finance (grant/seed/VC).</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span class="fontstyle2">These descriptors do not replace the two categories; they make samples auditable and enable meaningful cross-study comparisons.</span></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8565" src="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-2.png" alt="" width="662" height="345" srcset="https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-2.png 662w, https://minib.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/005-f-2-300x156.png 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 662px) 100vw, 662px" /></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The implications of this conceptual synthesis and bibliometric analysis are far-reaching for institutional reporting and policy design. The evidence supports four distinct claims, providing a foundation for cumulative research. In essence, the findings validate the necessity of dual operational categories and a standardized reporting mechanism:</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">Definitional Clarity (RQ1): The distinction is operational. The Academic Spin-Off requires formal IP transfer (license, assignment, or in-kind contribution of IP originating in a HEI/PRO) at founding, while the Academic Spin-Out derives from knowledge and teams without such a formal transfer.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">Regulatory Bias (RQ2 &amp; RQ3): Regulatory regimes, including AUTM-style license windows and CEE special-purpose vehicles, systematically bias statistical samples. This bias is mirrored in the thematic clustering of the 2015–2025 literature, validating the necessity of two distinct operational categories.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">• </span><span class="fontstyle0">Practical Implication (RQ4): The solution is dual-track reporting (spin-offs and spinouts). This system, augmented with Minimal Descriptors – asset type, linkage form, infrastructure, and financing – enables cross-institutional comparability without erasing IP-light trajectories.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Taken together, these answers realign the field’s vocabulary with its measurement practice, reduce the risk of category error in cross-national benchmarking, and provide a workable foundation for cumulative, comparable research on university spin-offs and spin-outs.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><strong><span class="fontstyle2">6. Limitations and future research</span></strong></span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">The synthesis is limited by the scope of Scopus database coverage, by inconsistencies in indexing practices for author and indexed keywords, and by parameter choices in cooccurrence mapping (e.g. minimum-occurrence thresholds, normalization methods). Software-, data-, and AI-intensive paths may be undercounted when authors or indexers label them inconsistently. Beyond bibliometric data, transaction-level evidence remains limited and fragmented: license terms, equity ranges, times-to-deal, and follow-on finance are rarely linked to venture-level outcomes in public datasets.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Further research should therefore combine bibliometric analysis with transaction data from TTOs and public registers; conduct comparative legal and institutional analyses of IP ownership regimes (e.g., Bayh‒Dole-style versus “professor’s privilege” models); and use mixed methods to study founder decision-making and university governance.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">For CEE, careful mapping of SPV-mediated pathways is essential to avoid double counting and to attribute value creation correctly. Developing a multidimensional typology and a panel of indicators suitable for implementation in national and international statistical systems remains a priority for cumulative progress.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><span class="fontstyle0" style="font-size: 18pt;"><span class="fontstyle2">7. Conclusions</span></span></strong></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">This article set out to achieve two objectives: first, to reconstruct the definitional landscape surrounding university-related ventures across scholarship, international standards and university policies; and second, to propose clear operational definitions of “academic spin-off” and “academic spin-out” that can be used consistently in management research and institutional reporting. Both aims have been addressed. The integrative review and the side-by-side treatment of institutional anchors clarified how inclusion rules shape what is counted, while the VOS viewer co-occurrence mapping situated these choices within the thematic structure of recent scholarship since 2015. The resulting definitions make the boundary conditions explicit and translate directly into recordable descriptors for comparable datasets.</span></p>
<p><span class="fontstyle0">Treating “spin-off” (necessarily involving formal IP transfer at founding) and “spinout” (involving academic provenance without required IP transfer at founding) as complementary operational categories, and documenting four simple flags per case, builds a practical bridge between scholarly constructs and institutional measurement. The alignment with the EU’s shift from “intellectual property” to “intellectual assets” increases transparency and reduces benchmarking errors. With clear categories and auditable descriptors, comparative research becomes less fragile, institutional dashboards more informative, and policy design better matched to the heterogeneous realities of university-driven entrepreneurship.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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